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PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Henry G. McMahon*
JURISDICTION

In Personam
The rapid expansion of our economy and the increasingly
migratory tendencies of the American people in recent years
have required the -broadening of the personal jurisdiction of
state courts over nonresidents far beyond the contemplation of
a half century ago. This has been made evident by the more
recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court,' and in the
various states by the more recent adoption of statutes to tap the
full potential of these decisions. 2 The decisions of the appellate
courts of Louisiana during the past term further confirm this
phenomenon.
Babineaux v. Southeastern Drilling Corp.3 well merits inclusion in all new casebooks on both Conflict of Laws and Civil
Procedure, for both the majority and dissenting opinions of the
Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, in this case are masterpieces of
exposition and legal reasoning. Here, the conviction of the
reader is tossed about like a leaf in an autumn breeze, as he
completes the reading and the rereading of these opinions.
Babineaux sued to recover workmen's compensation from the
named defendant, two of its corporate affiliates, and the compensation carriers of the three corporations, for a disabling injury received while he was working on an offshore drilling rig
*Boyd Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Particularly by International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945) and McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
2. More than twenty states have now adopted "long arm" statutes, of which
the Louisiana Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents Act (La. R.S. 13:320113:3207 (1950), added by La. Acts 1964, No. 47, § 3) is one of the broadest and
most recent.
3. 170 So. 2d 518 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965). This suit was instituted prior to
the adoption of the Louisiana "long arm" statute, and plaintiff invoked the personal jurisdiction of the Louisiana court over these foreign corporations on the
ground that they had conducted a business activity in this state, within the intendment of LA. R.S. 13:3471(1) (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1960, No. 32,

§ 1.
[581]
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in the Persian Gulf off Kuwait. The defendants filed numerous
exceptions to his petition, the most important of which challenged the personal jurisdiction of the Louisiana court on the
ground that the named defendant and its corporate affiliates
were foreign corporations not licensed to do business in Louisiana and had never done any business in this state. Considerable
evidence pro and con was introduced on the trial of the exceptions. The trial court sustained the exception to its jurisdiction
and several related exceptions and dismissed the suit.
On appeal, the majority of the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, reversed. Presiding Judge Tate wrote the majority opinion,
and Judge Hood vigorously dissented. The case turned on facts
which were as close to the line of jurisdictional damarcation as
any ever given on an examination by a law professor.
The majority, applying the rule of International Shoe 4 and
McGee," found sufficient minimal contacts which the defendants
had with the state of the forum to justify the maintenance of
the suit against them in Louisiana. These included their agent's
advertisement in a Lafayette, Louisiana, paper for experienced
oil field workers willing to work in the Persian Gulf to apply
personally at a Lafayette motel; the subsequent interview of
plaintiff and several other workers in that city; sending plaintiff
to Dallas, Texas, for a further interview; allowing plaintiff to
bring an unsigned contract of employment back with him to Lafayette to be considered by plaintiff and his wife there; the signing of the contract by plaintiff in Lafayette and mailing it back to
Dallas, where it was signed by the employer; requiring plaintiff
to go to New Orleans for a physical examination and the necessary inoculations against disease; sending to plaintiff in Lafayette a plane ticket to Kuwait, a travel expense check, and his
passport with the necessary visas; and requiring him to emplane
from New Orleans en route to Kuwait. The purchase and assembly in New Orleans of the drilling rig on which plaintiff
subsequently worked in the Persian Gulf, and its shipment to
Kuwait from that port, were given some weight by the majority
in reaching its conclusion that the Louisiana court had jurisdiction. In balancing the conveniences and inconveniences to the
parties of the suit in Louisiana, the majority was influenced to
some extent by the fact that two of these corporations (includ4. international Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
5. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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ing plaintiff's employer at the time of the injury) were Panamanian corporations which had no offices or business establishments anywhere in the United States, and by the probability that
if plaintiff had to sue in Texas, where the contract of employment was completed, he would be met by the same defenses interposed to the Louisiana suit.
The dissenting judge found the employing corporations' contacts with Louisiana insufficient to justify its courts' exercise
of personal jurisdiction over them, and stressed the fact that
the contract of employment was not completed in this state.
He was of the opinion that since the contract of employment
was signed by the employer in Texas, and it provided that it
was to be governed by the law of that state, a Texas commission or court was the appropriate forum for the adjudication
of the case.
The extent to which the personal jurisdiction of the courts
of a state over nonresidents is being broadened is indicated
by the fact that, even in as close a case as this, the Supreme
Court of Louisiana refused to review the decision of the intermediate appellate court," and a subsequent appeal to the United
States Supreme Court was dismissed on the ground that no
7
substantial federal question was presented.
Shaw v. Texas & Pacific Ry. 8 is another case which appreciably broadened the court's jurisdiction in personam over a foreign corporation licensed to do business in Louisiana. Plaintiff
sued to recover damages, under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act, for the death of her intestate because of defendant's failure
to provide him with a safe place to work, resulting in his accidental death. The deceased had been employed in Louisiana as
a cook on one of defendant's work trains, worked for some
period in this state, and later went to work in Texas, where
he was killed. This broadening of personal jurisdiction is indicated by the following language of the court :9
"[C]onsidering the fact that he was hired to perform and
did perform a substantial part of his duties in this State,
6. Babineaux v. Southeastern Drilling Corp., 247 La. 613, 172 So. 2d 700
(1965).
7. Seacat Marine Drilling Co. v. Babineaux, 86 Sup. Ct. 67 (U.S. 1965). Mr.
Justice Harlan was of the opinion that the appeal should have been dismissed
for want of jurisdiction.
8. 170 So. 2d 874 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
9. Id. at 877.
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we are of the opinion that although the accident happened
in the State of Texas, the cause of action grows out of Mack
Shaw's employment in this State and is connected with the
business done by defendant in this State."
Certainly, this is a far more liberal interpretation of the
statutory language "growing out of or connected with the business done by the corporation in this state"'10 than has been accorded in earlier cases."
ABANDONMENT OF ACTIONS

The period of inaction required
in the trial court in Louisiana is
lengthy time, three decisions of the
past term affirmed such dismissals

for the dismissal of a suit
five years. 1 2 Despite this
appellate courts during the
by the trial courts.

in Henry v. Stephens, 8 the case was tried in the court below
on April 2, 1958, and plaintiff's brief was not filed in that court
until July 15, 1963. Defendant successfully moved in the trial
court to have the action dismissed on the ground of its abandonment. In the appellate court plaintiff relied strongly on the
fact that the transcript of the testimony had been certified and
filed in the trial court by the court reporter within the fiveyear period. The appellate court properly held that these actions
by the court reporter were not sufficient to keep the case
alive. Unfortunately, the appellate court reached a proper result through an application of the rule obtaining prior to 1960
that a "step in the prosecution of the case consists of some
formal move before the court intended to hasten judgment."
This rule was applied by the same appellate court later, in
DeClouet v. Kansas City Southern Ry.,14 to reach an unfortunate result. There, prior to the expiration of the five-year
period, the plaintiff took the depositions of the defendant's
engineer, fireman, and possibly other employees, for purposes
of discovery, under a stipulation between counsel as to the time,
10. LA. R.S. 12:202(A)(3) (1950).
11. E.g., Staley-Wynne Oil Corp. v. Loring Oil Co., 182 La. 1007, 162 So. 756
(1935) ; -arnischfeger Sale Corp. v. Sternberg, .79 La. 317, 154 So. 10 (1934)
cf. Louisville & N. R.R. v. Chatters, 279 U.S. 329 (1929).
12. Under LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 561 (1960).

13. 169 So. 2d 422 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
14. 176 So. 2d 471 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
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place, and manner of taking these depositions.1 5 However, as
there was no necessity for any court order, there was no "formal
move before the court"; and in the trial court defendant successfully moved for dismissal of the suit on the ground of abandonment. By a divided vote, the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit,
affirmed this decision, with Judge Frug6 dissenting. Judge Tate,
who had not participated in the original hearing, dissented from
the court's refusal to grant a rehearing. The Supreme Court
refused to review the decision of the intermediate appellate
court.16
This decision has dangerous possibilities, as conceivably both
parties may be preparing their cases for trial by taking depositions, and using various of the discovery devices, without either
the necessity for or the possibility of obtaining a single court
order. As this decision is to be the subject of a note in the
following issue of the Review,' 7 the reader is referred there for
an analysis and discussion of the case. For present purposes,
it suffices to point out that the Louisiana State Law Institute
is now considering an amendment of the pertinent code article 8
to straighten out the procedural law on this point.
The third case on this subject 9 applies settled rules of law
and reaches a proper result, but presents a curious and novel
combination of procedural principles. There, the appellate court
affirmed the judgment of the court below dismissing the action
with respect to the individual defendants, but held that steps
taken by the plaintiffs in the prosecution of the suit against the
corporate defendant prevented its abandonment with respect to
that party. However, since the individual defendants were indispensable parties to the litigation, and the action was held
abandoned as to them, the suit was also dismissed by the appellate court as to the corporate defendant.
15. Under LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1421 (1960).
16. DeClouct v. Kansas City So. fly., 178 So. 2d 662 (La. 1965).

17. 26 LA. L. REV. 719 (April 1966).
18. This proposed amendment would change the language of the first paragraph of LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 561 (1960) to read as follows:
"An action is abandoned when the parties fail to take any action, consisting
of a formal move in the trial court to further its prosecution or defense, the
taking of a deposition. or the use of any of the discovery devices, for a period of
five years. This provision shall be operative without formal order, but on ex parte
motion of any party or other interested person, the trial court shall enter a formal
order of dismissal as of the date of its abandonment."
19. Bolden v. Brazile, 172 So. 2d 304 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
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PLEADING
Exceptions
That rare phenomenon of the present decade, appellate affirmance of the trial court's dismissal because the petition stated
no right or cause of action, occurred during the past term. In
the case in question,2 0 plaintiff sued a tavern keeper to recover
damages for injuries received when struck on a public highway
in front of the tavern by a passing automobile. Plaintiff alleged
that, at closing time, he was led out of the tavern by defendant's
employee; and, as he was intoxicated at the time, he wandered
to the adjacent highway where the accident occurred. The appellate court held that defendant's employee was under no continuing duty to the plaintiff to follow him and protect him
against injury.
That most highly unstable of all legal concepts in Louisiana
res judicata - presented itself for re-examination during the
past term. In Rousseo v. Atlas Fin. Co.,21 plaintiff sought the
recovery of damages for the judicial sale under execution of
two dump trucks which he claimed were exempt from seizure
as implements of his trade or occupation. In the original suit,
after the seizure of the trucks, the present plaintiff had ruled
the judgment creditor into court to show cause why the trucks
should not be released as exempt property, but his rule was dismissed after trial. A devolutive appeal from this judgment later
was dismissed as moot, as the trucks had been sold pending the
appeal. To his present suit defendant excepted in the trial court
on the grounds of res judicata and that the petition disclosed no
cause of action. Plaintiff appealed from the judgment dismissing his suit on the latter ground. The appellate court made
short shrift of this procedural objection, but experienced considerable difficulty in deciding that the judgment dismissing the
rule to release the trucks was not res judicata of the present
suit. Though the facts here are somewhat different from those
of prior decisions, the result reached by the appellate court ap22
pears to be sound.

-

20. Lee v. Peerless Ins. Co., 175 So. 2d 381 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
21. 167 So. 2d 495 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
22. In addition to the decisions relied on by the appellate court, compare Lee v.
Cooper, 155 La. 143, 98 So. 869 (1924), and see Comment, Res Judicata"Matters Which Might Have Been Pleaded," 2 LA. L. REV. 491, 502, 503 (1940).
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A novel and most interesting point was presented in National
Surety Corp. v. Standard Ace. Ins. Co.28 through the defendant's plea of the liberative prescription of one year, which had
been sustained in both the trial and the intermediate appellate
courts.2 4 Within a year of the accident, the compensation carrier
of the injured person had instituted suit against the alleged tortfeasor to recover the compensation payments which it was liable
for as the result of an injury to its insured resulting from the
defendant's alleged negligence. More than a year after the injury, the injured workman intervened in the suit, asserting
his right to damages sustained in excess of the amount which
would be recovered by the plaintiff.
The courts had previously recognized the insurer's right to
intervene, more than a year after the accident, in the insured's
suit against the tortfeasor.2 5 In these cases, the rationale of the
decision was that the original plaintiff had timely instituted
the action, and as the defendant could not be subjected to greater
liability if the intervenor recovered, it had no interest in pleading that the demand asserted through the intervention was prescribed. Both the trial court and the court of appeal refused
to apply this analogy to the facts of the principal case, and
pointed out that here the intervention might subject the defendant to greater liability.
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Hamlin, took
a completely different approach to the problem, which it solved
through a broad and liberal interpretation of the statute relating
to the interruption of prescription by suit.26 The statutory language which it found pertinent reads as follows:
"All prescriptions affecting the cause of action therein
sued upon are interrupted as to all defendants, . . . by the
commencement of a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction and in the proper venue."
The Supreme Court pointed out that, while the intervener's
demand was different from that of the original defendant, both
demands were based on the same cause of action; and, conse23. 247 La. 905, 175 So. 2d 263 (1965).
24. See National Surety Corp. v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 168 So. 2d 858 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1964).
25. In Mayon v. Delta Well Logging Serv., 127 So. 2d 16 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1961) and Walton v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 152 So. 760 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1934).
26. LA. R.S. 9:5801 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1960, No. 31, § 1.
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quently, the plaintiff's suit interrupted the running of prescription against the common cause of action.
Third-Party Demand
In Smith v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 27 where a
wife sued the alleged tortfeasor and its insurer to recover damages for injuries sustained in a collision of automobiles, the
defendants called her husband in as a third-party defendant.
They alleged that he was driving the car in which his wife was
riding at the time of the accident; that the accident resulted,
at least in part, from the husband's negligence; and that, if defendants were cast, they were entitled to enforce contribution
against the husband. Both the trial and the intermediate appellate courts held that, in view of the intraspousal immunity from
suit between husband and wife,28 the defendants had no right
to enforce contribution against the husband. Under a writ of
review, the Supreme Court, by a divided vote, reversed. 29 The
majority held that the intraspousal immunity of the spouses
was a procedural, rather than a substantive, bar; and that, as
third persons, the defendants had a right to enforce contribution against the husband, if the latter's negligence contributed
proximately to the accident.
In the only other third-party demand case, 0 the Court of
Appeal, Third Circuit, approved its prior decision in Harvey
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 31 holding that a defendant's right to enforce contribution against his co-tortfeasor was a subrogatory
right which could no longer be asserted after plaintiff compromised his claim against the co-tortfeasor.
DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY
In Geolograph Serv. Corp. v. Southern Pac. Co. 32 the Court
of Appeal, First Circuit, by a divided vote, set aside the order
of the trial court requiring defendant to produce all written
27. 164 So. 2d 647 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
28. Under LA. R.S. 9:291 (1950), added by La. Acts 1960, No. 31, § 2.
29. Smith v. Southern Farm Bur. Cas. Ins. Co., 247 La. 695, 174 So. 2d 122
(1965), noted 26 LA. L. REV. 414 (1966).
30. Taylor v. Southern Farm Bur. Cas. Ins. Co., 174 So. 2d 136 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1965).
31. 163 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964), noted 25 LA. L. REv. 915 (1965).
This case is also discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1963-1964 term--Civil Procedure, 25 LA. L. REV. 322, 334 (1965).
32. 172 So. 2d 128 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
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statements made by all members of the train crew involved
in the accident, so that plaintiff might inspect and copy them.38
Plaintiff had taken the depositions of the engineer and switchman, but had made no effort to take those of any other member
of the train crew. On ex parte motion, plaintiff obtained an
order requiring defendant to produce all statements made by
members of the train crew, including the engineer and switchman, alleging merely that plaintiff had reason to believe and
suspect that the production of these statements would disclose
evidence of the negligence of defendant's employees. After
moving unsuccessfully in the trial court to set aside this order,
defendant applied for supervisory writs to coerce the trial judge
into vacating it. Based largely upon federal precedents interpreting the source of the pertinent code article requiring that
good cause be shown for the production of these statements,
and a holding that no sufficient cause had been shown here,
the majority of the appellate court set aside the trial court's
order. Actually, there is far greater support for this posi34
tion than the opinion indicates.
5
Simon v. Castille1
recognized the validity of an order requiring plaintiff to submit to a physical examination by a physician of defendant's choice outside the presence of the plaintiff's attorney. This is a sound rule essential to even-handed
justice. The presence of plaintiff's attorney during plaintiff's
examination by defendant's physician serves only to impede
and obstruct the examination. Further, most physicians see an
ethical objection to such an examination, and will not conduct
it under these conditions.

Kommer v. Assenheimer3

6

reached no novel result, but its

33. Under

LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1492 (1960).
34. Louisiana has gone far beyond the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
limiting the production of statements taken by a party, through its adoption of
the "Hickman amendment." While this limitation is embodied in article 1452,
relating to protective orders during the taking of depositions upon oral examina-

tion, article 1492 adopts this limitation with respect to the production of documents for inspection and copying. The "Hickman amendment" reads as follows:
"The court shall not order the production or inspection of any writing obtained or prepared by the adverse party, his attorney, surety, indemnitor, expert,
or agent in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial unless satisfied
that denial of production or inspection will unfairly prejudice the party seeking the
production or inspection in preparing his claim or defense or will cause him undue
hardship or injustice. The court shall not order the production or inspection of
any part of the writing that reflects the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions,
or theories of an attorney or an expert."
35. 174 So. 2d 660 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
36. 174 So. 2d 197 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
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holding is of sufficient importance to the profession to justify
its noting here. Plaintiffs were held not entitled to tax the
costs of discovery depositions, not introduced in evidence or
otherwise used at the trial, as costs of court.
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ADVERSARY
Under a writ of review the Supreme Court, in Soprano v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,3 7 held that when a wife sued her
husband's insurer under the Direct Action Statute to recover
for injuries sustained through his negligence in operating his
car in which the wife was riding, she had no right to call her
husband as a witness under cross-examination. 3 8 Prior contrary
decisions of the intermediate appellate courts39 were expressly
overruled. Curiously enough, the Supreme Court did not find
it necessary to reverse the judgment in favor of the wife rendered in the courts below, and to remand the case for a new
40
trial.
APPEALS AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Right to Appeal
When an insurer which is not authorized to do business in
Louisiana is sued here, the Insurance Code permits it to object
to the service of citation and to the jurisdiction of the court
in personam.4 However, to file other pleadings, the unauthorized insurer first must either post a bond sufficient to satisfy
any judgment which might be rendered against it, or obtain
a license to do business in this state. 42 In Vehrs v. Jefferson Ins.
Co.413 the unauthorized insurer filed the declinatory exception
to plaintiff's suit objecting to the citation and the personal jurisdiction of the court. After this exception was overruled,
the unauthorized insurer did not answer, and a default judgment against it was taken and confirmed. The insurer then
took an appeal from the final judgment, for the sole purpose
37. 246 La. 524, 165 So. 2d 308 (1964).
38. Under LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1634 (1960),
39. Soprano v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 155 So. 2d 287 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1963) and Montalbano v. IJall, 108 So. 2d 16 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958).
40. Although the trial court permitted plaintiff to call her husband as a witness under cross-examination, strangely enough he did not permit rounsel for
plaintiff to lead the husband during his examination.
41. Lt. R.S. 22:1255(C) (1950)".
42. LA. R.S. 22:1255(A) (1950).
43, 166 So.2d 20 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).

19661

PROCEDURE

of obtaining a review of the trial court's ruling on its exception. The appellee moved to dismiss the appeal on the grounds
that: (1) the appellant had not posted the required bond or
qualified to do business here; and (2) the overruling of the
declinatory exception was an interlocutory judgment which was
not appealable.
The intermediate appellate court held that since, under the
Insurance Code, the insurer was permitted to object to the citation and personal jurisdiction of the court, it could have the
trial court's rulings on these objections reviewed on appeal. The
second ground of the motion to dismiss was brushed aside by
an application of the settled rule that an appeal from the final
judgment brings up for appellate review all of the interlocutory
judgments rendered in the case by the trial court.
The jurisprudence has established the general rule that a
party may not appeal from a judgment which grants him all
of the relief for which he has prayed. However, this rule is
relaxed when adverse (and usually collateral) adjudications in
the judgment may prejudice the appealing party.44 Such an ex45
ception was recognized in Simpson v. Kimbell Milling Co.,
where the judgment from which the two defendants appealed
rejected the plaintiff's demand on the ground of his contributory negligence, but, en passant, held that the defendant driver
was also negligent. A suit by the corporate defendant here
against the plaintiff here to recover damages sustained in the
same accident was then pending in a federal district court, and
appellants feared that the trial court's finding on the question
of the driver's negligence might be made the basis of the defense in the federal case of either res judicata or estoppel by
judgment. This was held sufficient to give the successful parties
46
below the right to appeal.
44. See the cases cited in Comment (i) under LA. CODE OF CIVIL 'ROCEDURE
art. 2085 (1960).
45. 164 So. 2d 637 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
46. The appeal probably would have been dismissed had the second case been
pending in a Louisiana rather than a federal court, as the successful parties
below could not then have been prejudiced by the judgment. Under Louisiana
law, res judicata would not apply, as the two demands were not the same, LA.
CIVIL CODE art. 2286 (1870) and Quarles v. Lewis, 226 La. 76, 75 So. 2d 14
(1954); and estoppel by judgment is an Anglo-American concept which is not
now recognized in Louisiana. Hope v. Madison, 194 La. 337, 139 So. 666 (1940).
See also The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1957-1958 Term.Civil Procedure,19 LA. L. REv. 388, 390-93 (1959) and Comment, Res Judicata"Matters Which Might Have Been Pleaded," 2 LA. L. REv. 491 (1940).
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During the past term, 47 the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit,
approved its prior decision in Vidrine v. Simoneaux.48 In the
latter case it was pointed out that, as a result of the recent
grant of the substantive right to enforce contribution against
a co-tortfeasor, 49 an appeal by one of two defendants from a
judgment against him brought up for appellate review that
portion of the judgment rejecting plaintiff's demand against
the other defendant.
Procedure for Appealing
The new procedural code imposes upon the clerk of the
trial court the duty to file the record of appeal in the appellate court,', but requires the appellant to pay to this clerk, at
least three days before the final return date, the fees for preparing the record and filing it in the appellate court.51 No
provision of positive law requires the trial court clerk to notify
appellant of the fees to be paid and the date when due; and,
consequently, counsel for appellant must inquire as to any extension of the return date and the fees to be paid. Different
customs in different sections of the state are producing different results when appellant fails to pay these fees timely, and as
a result the record is not filed in the appellate court timely.
The clerk of the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans
has established a practice of issuing timely notices of the fees
to be due and the date when these must be paid, and having
these notices served by the sheriff on counsel for appellants.
As a consequence, in a case where this notice was not so served,
the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, refused to dismiss the
appeal, holding that the late filing of the record was not attributable to counsel for appellant.5 2 In Vernon Parish, where
no such practice had ever been inaugurated by the clerk of the
district court, an appeal was dismissed when the late filing
of the record in the appellate court was due to the failure of
47. In

Fontenot v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 168 So. 2d 478 (La. App. 3d

Cir.48.1964).
145 So. 2d 400 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962). This decision was
later approved
by the Supreme Court in Emmons v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 245 La. 411, 158 So. 2d

594 (1963):
49. By LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2103 (1870), as amended by La. Acts 1960, No.

30, § 1.

50. LA. COQE Q "CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2127 (1960).
51. Id. art. 2126.
52. Atlantic Gulf Supply Corp.v.McDonald, 171 So. 2d 48I (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1965). See also Mathies v. Freuhauf Trailer Co., 170 So. 2d 785 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1965).
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counsel for appellant to pay these fees timely to the clerk of
the trial court. 3
Procedure in Appellate Court
Under the new procedural code, a motion to dismiss the
appeal must be filed within three days (exclusive of holidays)
of the return day or lodging of the record in the appellate
court, whichever is later, if the motion is based on some irregularity, error, or defect imputable to the appellant. 54 However,
if the motion to dismiss is based on lack of jurisdiction, or
appellant's lack of a right to appeal, or on the abandonment
of the appeal, the motion to dismiss may be filed "at any
time."55 There is a conflict in the jurisprudence as to whether
appellant's failure to file the appeal bond timely is jurisdictional, or is merely an error or irregularity. 6 In two cases
decided during the past term, the motion to dismiss was filed
after the appellate court had rendered its judgment; and both
held that the late filing of the appeal bond was jurisdictional,
and hence the motion to dismiss need not be filed within the
three-day period. However, the two cases are in conflict. In
Orrell v. Southern Farm Bur. Cas. Ins. Co., 7 decided by the
Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, it was held that the motion
to dismiss was filed too late. In Britt v. Brocato,5 8 decided by
the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, the motion was held timely,
the appellate court's judgment was recalled and vacated, and
the appeal was dismissed.
The only other noteworthy case in this area was General
Motors Accept. Corp. v. Deep South Pest Control, 9 where the
Supreme Court, under a writ of review, affirmed the intermediate appellate court's decision 60 that the order of a trial
court denying an application for a new trial was not appealable,
and a motion to dismiss the appeal on this ground need not
be filed within the three-day period.
53. McMillen Feeder Fin. Corp. v. Thompson, 171 So. 2d 827 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1965).
54. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2161 (1960).
55. 7d. art. 2162.
56. See the cases cited in Orrell v. Southern Farm Bur. Cas. Ins. Co., 174
So. 2d 841 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
57. 174 So. 2d 841 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
58. 170 So. 2d 516 (l.a. App. 4th. Cir. 1965).
59. 247 La. 625, 173 So. 2d 190 (1965).
60. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Deep South Pest Control, 166 So. 2d
46 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
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Rule XI, section 2, of the Uniform, Rules of the Louisiana
Courts of Appeal provides that "In the case of an application
for rehearing sent through the mail for filing, it shall be deemed
timely filed when the official U. S. postmark upon the envelope
transmitting such application shows that it was mailed on or
before the fourteenth day." In Roberts v. Houston Fire & Cas.
Co.,," the appellate court held that an application for rehearing
received at its clerk's office after the fourteen-day period was
not filed timely, even though it was postage metered within
that period, where the postage meter's postmark was not an
"official U. S. postmark."
SUPERVISORY JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE

Prior to 1960, the courts of appeal had no supervisory jurisdiction, except in aid of their appellate jurisdiction.6 2 In the appellate reorganization which went into effect that year, each of
the intermediate appellate courts was granted "supervisory jurisdiction, subject to the general supervisory jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, over all inferior courts in cases in which an appeal would lie to the court of appeal." 63 It was generally understood in the profession that the Supreme Court would not exercise its general supervisory jurisdiction in any case in which an
appeal would lie to a court of appeal, unless the latter had exercised, or refused to exercise, its supervisory jurisdiction.
Two cases decided by the Supreme Court during the past
term6 4 go far, as a practical matter, in delaying the exercise
of the general supervisory jurisdiction of our highest court. In
these cases, the Supreme Court construed the constitutional provisions as preventing any exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction to review a court of appeal's refusal to grant remedial
writs unless an application for rehearing had been filed in and
refused by the intermediate appellate court. In effect, the Supreme Court held that it could review such a case only under
61. 170 So. 2d 188 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).

62. See Bailey v. Spiro, 169 So. 898 (La. App. Or. Cir. 1936) and cases
cited.
63. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 29, as amended on November 4, 1958.
64. Joint Legislative Committee v. Fuselier, 247 La. 723, 174 So. 2d 133
(1965) ; Pelloat v. Greater New Orleans Expressway Comm'n, 248 La. 122, 176
So.2d 452 (1965).
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the writ of review,6 5 rather than under its general supervisory
67
jurisdiction. 6 Prior cases had indicated a contrary result.
The writer regards as unfortunate this enlargement of the
time lapse in cases where a litigant's only relief may be afforded
through the supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. In
a commendable effort to alleviate the situation, the Uniform
Rules of the Louisiana Courts of Appeal have been amended to
make provision for an application for rehearing from their refusals to grant remedial writs.6 8 The increased time lapse may
be minimized somewhat by the immediate filing of such an application, and immediate action thereon by the intermediate
appellate court. More alarming, however, is the potential for
employing dilatory tactics, when the proceedings in the trial
court are stayed through the filing of frivolous applications for
remedial writs.
SUMMARY

PROCEDURE

The rignt to use summary process was involved in Succession
of Smith,9 where the surviving husband attempted to assert his
claim to a half interest in certain property treated as belonging
to his deceased wife's separate estate through an opposition to
the final account of the executor. The intermediate appellate
court held that this claim could be asserted only through an
ordinary action, and sustained the executor's exception to the
improper use of summary procedure. Under a writ of review,
the Supreme Court held that, regardless of what designation
was affixed to the pleading, it was actually a motion to traverse
the inventory of the succession where summary process could
be used. However, after reviewing the evidence, the Supreme
Court held that the property in question belonged to the wife,
and that the community had no interest therein.70
65. Sanctioned by LA. CoNSr. art. VII, § 11.

66. Sanctioned by id. art. VII, §§ 10 and 29, as amended on November 4, 1958.
67. Cf. In re Lindner, 122 La. 683, 48 So. 150 (1908). See also Davis v.
LeBlanc, 139 So. 2d 224, 226 n.1 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962), discussed in The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1961-1962 Term - Civil Procedure, 23
LA. L. REV. 378, 390 (1963) ; Comment Supervisory Powers of the Supreme Court
of Louisiana Over Inferior Courts, 34 TUL. L. REv. 165, 169 n.27 (1959).
68. Through the addition of a new section 7 to rule XII. Prior to this year,
no provision was made in these rules for any application for a rehearing from
a court's refusal to grant remedial writs, as it had been felt that the applicant
could apply immediately to the Supreme Court for an exercise of its general
supervisory jurisdiction.
69. 169 So. 2d 414 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
70. Succession of Smith, 247 La. 921, 175 So. 2d 269 (1965).
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EXECUTORY PROCESS
7
The facts and proceedings in HiberniaNat'l Bank v. Mary '
are somewhat involved and complicated. Reduced to its simplest
elements, the plaintiff there sought to enforce a mortgage for
more than $90,000 via executiva, and the mortgagor unsuccessfully sought in the trial court to arrest the seizure and sale
through injunction. After a trial of the rule for a preliminary
injunction, the trial court refused to issue the injunctive order.
However, it granted the mortgagor a suspensive appeal from
this order, conditioned on his furnishing a $9,000 suspensive
appeal bond, and further stayed "all proceedings" during the
pendency of the appeal. Under supervisory writs, the Court of
Appeal, Fourth Circuit, properly held that, under the pertinent
code provision,7 2 only the injunction proceedings could be stayed
during the pendency of the suspensive appeal, and modified the
trial court's order to revoke the stay of the executory proceedings.

PROBATE PROCEDURE

Jurisdiction
Succession of Simms 73 probably has presented as many interesting questions as any case decided during the past term.
The important point of procedural law which it recognized is
that a nonresident executor who had had the testament probated
in Louisiana, and had qualified as ancillary executor here, was
subject to the personal jurisdiction of the Louisiana court in an
action, brought after the judgment of possession had been rendered, to annul the testament insofar as it affected immovable
property in this state.
Administration of Successions
One of the basic articles in our present probate procedure,
adopted as a more workable substitute for prior articles based
on the ancient French doctrine of seizin, provides that the "succession representative shall be deemed to have possession of all
71. .167 So. 2d 200 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).

72.

LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

art. 3612 (1960).

73. 175 So. 2d 113 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965). The Supreme Court subsequently
issued a writ of review in this case, 247 La. 882, 175 So. 2d 112 (1965) ; but
the probabilities are that the writ issued only to review the substantive questions of trusts and succession law.
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property of the succession. ' 74 In one case, an executor interpreted this language literally and was successful in evicting the
deceased widow from the premises she had occupied since the
death of her husband. The Court of Appeal, Second Circuit,
properly reversed the judgment of eviction from which the
widow had suspensively appealed. The intermediate appellate
court held that the property belonged to the community which
had existed between the deceased and his widow; and that, as
the owner of an undivided half interest therein, the widow had
7 5
a legal right to occupy the premises.
The question of whether a succession representative may be
removed for anticipated mismanagement was settled by the Supreme Court in the negative in Succession of Houssiere.76 There,
the administratrix had indicated her intention 77 to pay her two
sons, who were serving as her attorneys, a large fee which the
other heirs regarded as exorbitant; and based on this, she had
been removed from office on the ground of mismanagement by
the trial court. The intermediate appellate court affirmed the
judgment of removal. 78 Under a writ of review, the Supreme
Court reversed, holding that no act of mismanagement had been
committed, as no attorneys' fees had been paid, and the other
heirs had a right to oppose any application by the administratrix
for judicial authority to pay a fee which the other heirs deemed
exorbitant.
THE REAL ACTIONS
The action to remove a cloud on title or, as it is sometimes
called, the action to quiet title, was borrowed by Louisiana jurisprudence from Anglo-American equity. Prior to 1908, there
was some need for this procedural borrowing, as the petitory,
possessory, and jactitory actions afforded no remedy in a case
where neither party was in possession of the property. However, in 1908, the legislature created a new procedural remedy
to fill in this hiatus -the action to establish title. 79 Thereafter,
74.

LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3211 (1960).
75. Coon v. Miller, 175 So. 2d 385 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
76. 247 La. 764, 174 So. 2d 521 (1965).
77. By estimating the attorneys' fees for handling the succession as $25,000
in both her federal estate tax return and in her state inheritance tax return.
78. Succession of Houssiere, 166 So. 2d 98 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
79. By La. Acts. 1908, No. 38, § 1, subsequently integrated into the statutory
revision as LA. R;S. 13:5062 (1950). The action to establish title has now been
merged into the broadened petitory action, LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROcEDuR arts.
3651-3653 (1960).
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there was no need for the action to remove a cloud on title, and
it should have withered on the vine; but unfortunately it was
utilized from time to time thereafter, and this occasional use
preserved its life.
One of the most serious mistakes made by the Louisiana State
Law Institute in the redaction of the new Procedural Code - and
for this the writer must assume most of the responsibility was that this remedy was not suppressed at the time. 0 This
mistake bore fruit almost immediately, for in Walmsley v. Pan
American Petroleum Corp.,"' its continued existence was not only
recognized, but the remedy was extended to cover a case where
the defendant mineral lessee was actually in possession. The
rule of the Walmsley case probably will not be applied again
except to a case presenting the identical, and peculiarly harsh,
facts of that case.8 2 As the action to quiet title does not recognize possession as creating a presumption of ownership, and further does not permit possession to play its historic role as arbiter
of the burden of proof, it has been subjected to severe criticism.8
4
In Shell v. Greer,"
the action was again successfully employed. From the facts stated in the opinion of the intermediate
appellate court, it appears that plaintiff was in possession of
the property and could have obtained the identical relief through
the broadened possessory action based on a disturbance in law. 5
One possibility for consigning the action to remove a cloud on
title to virtual obsolescence would be for the courts to treat it as
either a petitory or possessory action, dependent upon which
party is alleged to be in possession. There is respectable precedent for such a judicial technique.8 6

80. The action to remove a cloud on title was not considered during the
redaction of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. See Introduction to Title 11
of Book VII.
81. 244 La. 513, 153 So. 2d 375 (1963).
82. "Plaintiffs, finding themselves embroiled in a title dispute with the state,
were either unable to secure permission to bring suit or found the procedures for
doing so too awesome a prospect." The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1962-1963 Term-Mineral Law, 24 LA. L. REv. 215, 231 (1964).
83. Id. at 229-36. See also Zengel, The Reat Actions -A
Study in Code Revision, 29 TUL. L. REV. 617, 634 n.59 (1955).
84. 171. So. 2d 672 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
85. Under LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDUIE arts. 3655 and 3659 (1960).
86. "The characterization of a pleading by the litigant is not .controlling.
Pleadings. are taken for what they really are, and not for what their authors
designate. them. A court should not eject a justiciable cause merely because it is
dressed in the wrong coat." Succession of Smith, 247 La. 921, 928, 175 So. 2d
269, 271 (1965).

